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Abstract
Dashboard cameras (“dashcams”) are becoming an important in-car accessory used to record audio
and visual footage of car journeys. The audio/video footage produced by dashcams have become
important items of evidence.
This paper explores the problems related to the management and processing of dashcam evidence,
and in particular, highlights challenges to the admissibility of evidence submitted online. The key
contribution of this paper is to outline the results of an experiment which aimed to reveal the preva-
lence and provenance of artefacts created by the use of dashcams on the SD storage system of seven
dashcam systems.
The research describes the provenance of evidential artefacts relating to: the dashcam recording
mode, GPS data, vehicular speed data, licence plate data, and temporal data which was found in at
least six locations - namely: NMEA files, configuration/diagnostic files, EXIF metadata, directory
structures, filename structures and imagery watermarks.
Keywords: dashcam, digital forensic, video forensics
1. Introduction
A dashboard camera (“dashcam”) is an in-vehicle mountable camera which records video and
audio footage of vehicle journeys. Dashcams create numerous artefacts of evidential value such as
GPS data, temporal data, vehicular speed data, audio, video and photographic images.
Provisions - such as the self-evident app which enables witnesses to upload videos and statements
directly to law enforcement agencies, have existed for a while [69]. The first dedicated UK dashcam
evidence submission portal was established by Nextbase in 2018 [43]. This portal became a central
point for managing the submission of dashcam evidence on behalf of UK police forces. It should
be noted, that not all UK police forces are accepting evidence in this manner. Table 1 provides an
overview of how - if at all, UK police forces are accepting dashcam evidence. The Nextbase portal
manages the dashcam evidence submission process by either accepting the submission and forwarding
to the relevant police authority, or redirecting users to the police authority website for the evidence
submission. At the time of writing, 5 police forces accept evidence submitted through the Nextbase
portal, another 14 accept evidence submitted directly to them, 17 intend to begin accepting evidence
and 7 are not accepting the online submission of dashcam evidence.
The visual evidence produced by dashcams is persuasive and compelling [55] - possibly because
dashcam evidence is not subject to the same features of perspective bias that systems such as body
camera systems are [66].
Table 2 presents an overview of legal cases involving dashcam evidence. The table shows that
dashcam evidence has been used to reveal compromising audio conversations as in the case of Patrick
Collins [70] and Shane Mullen and Gez Bennett [8], and also as evidence captured by third parties such
as in the case of Ian Welsby [19], Chloe May [23], and Marcin Dariusz Purlis [15]. These cases indicate
that although not all UK police authorities are currently accepting dashcam evidence submitted online
?A dataset comprising of a number of dashcam recordings is available to accompany this paper. To get access to this
dataset, please visit http://lallie.co.uk/csdi/ and look at the information under the publication entry for this paper
Email address: HL@warwick.ac.uk (Harjinder Singh Lallie)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier April 22, 2020
(as shown in Table 1), it is likely that this mode of submission might become more common, and that
law enforcement agencies around the world will become more proactive in seeking dashcam evidence
for incidents [6].
Maybe as a consequence, dashcam usage is increasing rapidly in the UK. In 2015, 9% of drivers were
using dashcams [7], this rose to 15% in 2016 [62], 17% in 2017 [3], and 27% in 2018 [4]. Nottingham
Police recorded 211,598 dashcam records over a three year period leading up to 2017 [45].
This paper explores two aspects of dashcam evidence: the problems related to the management
and processing of dashcam evidence (Section 3), and an analysis of artefacts generated by dashcams
(Section 4). the discussion in Section 4 presents the results of an experiment which aimed to reveal
the prevalence and provenance of artefacts created by the use of dashcams on the SD storage system
of seven dashcam systems.
2. Previous research
Dashcam forensics draws together a number of forensic domains including traditional file system
forensics (the subject of the present paper) and video/imagery/audio related forensics. The predom-
inance of research into video/imagery/audio related forensics is evidenced by a number of literature
reviews which focus on: watermarking as a means of authenticating recordings [2]; source camera
identification, forgery detection, and steganalysis [51]; and published literature in the domain of video
forgery/tamper detection, video re-capture, phylogeny detection, video anti-forensics and counter
anti-forensics [57].
Similarly, there is a lot of research investigating the problem of image forgery [17, 9, 49]. Although
image forgery is a concern in dashcam forensics, given that most of the evidence tends to be video
based, the present review does not focus on this area.
The rest of this review outlines previous research into assessing vehicle speed; extracting elements
such as text from recordings; assessing the authenticity of the source camera, source vehicle and the
video itself; and addressing privacy concerns.
2.1. Vehicle speed
Vehicular speed and geospatial data are important evidential artefacts. However, these can be
disabled by the user, and may not appear in dashcam recorded footage. Where vehicular speed and
GPS data is available in a watermark, there are questions relating to the extent to which metadata
presented as a video watermark can be relied upon [29].
A number of complimentary, methods of estimating vehicular speed have been proposed. For
example, Kamat and Kinsman [30] used uniformly spaced road markers painted on roads to estimate
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Table 2: Example dashcam cases
Case, court and date Summary
Scott vs Harris, 2010, United States Supreme
Court [18]
Deputy Scott accused of using excessive force to stop claimants car after a
car chase. Dashcam footage upheld Deputy Scott’s case
Regina vs Luke Whitchard, 2015 [65] Third party dashcam captures Whitchard dangerously overtaking cars on a
bend.
Regina Vs Stocks, 2015, Mold and Caernarfon
Crown Court [63]
Dashcam footage captures James Stocks recklessly overtaking other drivers -
closely missing a van driver which is forced off the road
Regina v Collins 2017/05113/A2 113 EWCA,
2018 Old Bailey [70]
Patrick Collin’s dashcam captures Collins knocking over and killing Selwyn
Clarke and a conversation admitting the accident moments later
German supreme court, 2018 [53] Plaintiff argues video footage of him crossing a red light breaches privacy
laws. Supreme court rules against the plaintiff.
Regina vs Marc Hyland, 2018, Northallerton
Magistrates [44]
Marc Hayland overtakes a series of vehicles waiting to turn
Regina vs Ryan Haffenden, 2017, Brighton
Magistrates Court [24]
Haffenden overtakes vehicles on a single carriageway - narrowly missing a
pedestrian and avoiding collision with oncoming traffic.
Regina vs Andrew Williams EWCA Crim 1886
WL 03777362 (Court of Appeal Criminal Di-
vision), 2018, Nottingham Magistrates Court
[42]
Andrew Williams was drunk and driving in speeds in excess of 120mph Vehicle
veered onto the hard shoulder and almost crashed into a motorcyclist.
Regina v Lewes Marcin Dariusz Purlis, EWCA
Crim 1134, 2017, (Criminal Division) [15]
Purlis convicted of robbery. Dashcam footage captured by a third party was
instrumental as was the evidence by a facial mapping expert
Gajdamowicz v First Glasgow Ltd, 2017, All
Scotland Sheriff Court [52]
Cyclist - Gajdamowicz knocked over by a bus attempting to overtake. Bus
camera shows Gajdamowicz wearing headphones and not indicating prior to
moving into the path of the bus. Case ruled in favour of First Glasgow.
Shane Mullen and Gez Bennett, 2015, War-
wick Crown Court [8]
Assailants carjacked a car and were captured in the car’s dashcam admitting
the theft.
Regina v Welsby (Ian), 2017, Hull Crown
Court [19]
Third party dashcam shows Ian Welsby clipping a motorcyclist Colin Walker
as he (Ian) cut a corner as he turned into a side street.
McIntosh v Harman [2018] EWHC 726 (QB),
2018, Queen’s Bench Division [61]
Police dashcam records PC Susan McIntosh knocked down by Barry Harman
as she (Susan) was interviewing members of the public.
Regina v Thompson (Chloe May) EWCA
Crim 1291 Court of Appeal [23], 2017, Maid-
stone Crown Court
Chloe Thompson crashed into the back of a vehicle at 80-88mph killing a
grandmother. Dashcam footage captured on a car travelling in the same
direction.
Harvey Schofield, 2018, Chester Magistrates’
Court, [12]
Harvey Schofield undertook a tipper truck and pulled out into the path of a
vehicle causing him to slam his brakes.
The term third party is used in the table to refer to a person or persons not directly involved in the incident.
vehicular speed, and Kim et al. [31] proposed the vehicle speed estimate method (VSEM) as a means
of estimating vehicle speed.
2.2. Extracting elements
Videos and images contain important textual data within the watermark and/or in the recorded
scene. Previous research has attempted to extract text from images using a Fully Convolutional Net-
work (FCN) model [71] or a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model [25], to extract watermarks
[1] and licence plate numbers [37] from video images.
Research in this domain is not restricted to the extraction of textual data and there are also
important contributions which have attempted to extract objects such as motorcyclists from videos
[38].
2.3. Assessing authenticity
A useful body of research has attempted to establish the authenticity of video footage. Koenig
and Lacey [33] outline a number of approaches designed to confirm the authenticity of video and
audio files and this section briefly outlines approaches such as - tamper protection, source camera
identification, source vehicle identification, and video anti-forensics detection.
Kadu et al. [28] propose a system which protects recordings from tampering by third parties by
storing them on a server and making them accessible only to an authenticated user and an administra-
tor (in case of a claim). The proposal by Kobayashi et al. [32] detects image tampering by analysing
noise characteristics - referred to as a noise level function (NLF).
Source camera identification methods attempt to identify the camera used to make a photograph
or video. One of the earlier contributions into source camera identification was presented by Kurosawa
et al. [35] who proposed a method to identify camcorders from the noise patterns created by a charge
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coupled device (CCD) fingerprint. Lukáš et al. [39] use Sensor Pattern Noises (SPNs) as device
fingerprints which can be used to identify digital devices. The problem with SPNs is that they can be
contaminated by scene based noise, Li [36] propose a mechanism for addressing this and enhancing
the device detection rate.
A lot of the research into camera identification focuses on high quality images. The contribution
by van Houten et al. [67] attempts to identify the source camera from low-quality videos.
Mehrish et al. [40] propose a framework for identifying the vehicle within which dashcam footage
was recorded. Their system uses motion patterns in the vehicle which create a unique blurring effect
on videos.
Algorithms used to identify the source camera of a photographic/video imagery can also be used
to detect the authenticity of photographic/video imagery. This was demonstrated by Mondaini et al.
[41] who used the SPN to detect forged videos. Chen et al. [11] proposed a framework for identifying
both the source of an image and the likelihood of the image having been tampered by analysing the
photo-response nonuniformity noise (PRNU).
Hsu et al. [22] attempt to reveal forged sections of video imagery from noise residue using noise
correlation. The method proposed by Hsu et al. requires still backgrounds and requires low video
compression.
2.4. Addressing privacy
The use of dashcams pose privacy risks because they are - as Wagner et al. puts it “surveillance
systems that are operated by private individuals in public places” [68]. Wagner et al. propose a solution
which identifies and disguises individuals faces and licence plates from a dashcam.
Such privacy concerns could inhibit the submission of dashcam evidence. The study by Park
et al. [48] of 481 participants in Korea found that although privacy concerns were an inhibitor to
users sharing dashcam footage, they were often able to rationalise footage sharing on the grounds of
reciprocal altruism/social justice and even monetary reward.
Privacy laws relating to videos recorded without explicit permission of the subject(s) vary from
country to country [48, 59]. Although the official position states that the processing of dashcam
evidence “must comply with the principles and rules of the GDPR” and that “the processing of personal
data by dashcams [must be] lawful.” [16], there are concerns that GDPR and other regulating laws
are not properly regulating the use of dashcams [68].
In the UK at least, where a vehicle is not being used for personal use - such as in taxis, the driver
must inform all the passengers of the use of the dashcam and ability to record private conversations.
Where a vehicle is being used by multiple drivers, all drivers should know that a dashcam is being
used.
Although there is a good deal of research into a number of related themes as highlighted herein,
there is no known research into the prevalence and provenance of evidential artefacts created by the
use of dashcams. As the use of dashcams increases, it will become increasingly important for law
enforcement agencies and researchers to understand the location, format and sources of evidential
artefacts. This paper attempts to address this imbalance.
3. Challenges Relating to the Management and Processing of Dashcam Evidence
Notwithstanding the convenience that online dashcam evidence submission provides, there are two
potential challenges relating to dashcam evidence:
 deterrents to witness engagement with the submission because of concerns about inadvertent
self-incrimination of traffic rule violation, or inadvertently contravening privacy regulation (the
latter is discussed in Section 2.4);
 challenges to the admissibility of digital evidence submitted online.
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The rest of this section considers challenges related to the admissibility of dashcam evidence.
Whilst the provision of online dashcam evidence submission could lead to an increase in successful
prosecutions, this should be considered against the increased investigative resource requirements such
as increased processing time and storage capacity.
A greater challenge however, relates to the admissibility of online dashcam evidence submission.
Witnesses submitting dashcam evidence generally have no evidential procedure/chain of custody
training. There is a period of time where the evidence is not under the control of a law enforce-
ment authority and potentially not governed by chain of custody rules. This can create admissibility
challenges. Consequently, safeguards must be built into the submission process relating to file modi-
fication, submission timeliness, footage timespan and evidence sharing.
These problem have been considered by UK police forces and the position of some police forces
in relation to the timespan between an incident and the submission of the associated evidence, re-
quirement for unedited video footage, existence of a timestamp watermark in the video footage and
pre-post incident footage is outlined in Table 3 and described herein.
Modification. Tools such as NextBase Player 3 allow users to join/trim videos, create title screens,
and adjust output settings. In an attempt to ensure that video is unaltered, some police forces require
unedited video footage (outlined as UEF in Table 3) which contains a timestamp (outlined as TS in
Table 3). There is a rich body of research which proposes methods for the detection of video forgery
- for instance [22] and [60] and more recently [34] and [58].
Timeliness. Most police forces specify a maximum time period between the road traffic incident
being reported to the evidence being uploaded (outlined as DSI in Table 3). This may be because
suspects in the UK must be served with a ‘notice of intended prosecution’ within 14 days of the
commission of the offence [64]. Although the 14 day time limit (where applied) aims to resolve this,
a submission made within 14 days of a declared date is not a guarantee that the incident took place
on that date. There is some scope for timestamps to be manipulated. Notwithstanding, laws relating
to perverting the course of justice (or the equivalent in local jurisdictions) aim to prevent evidence
tampering and should be sufficient to deter individuals from modifying timestamps [13].
Footage timespan. Some police forces require that the submission includes pre-incident and post
incident footage (outlined as BaAI in Table 3). For example, Surrey Police require that 2 minutes
Table 3: Sample police constabulary requirements on the submission of online dashcam evidence
Police Forces DSI BaAI TS UEF
Wiltshire 10 X X X
Wawrickshire NK X X X
West Mercia NK X X X
West Midlands NK X X X
North Yorkshire NK X X X
Avon and Somerset 7 X X X
Essex 2 X X X
Cheshire 3 X X X
Surrey 10 X X X
Sussex 10 X X X
Hampshire 10 X X X
Metropolitan Police 10 X X X
Thames Valley 10 X X X
Norfolk NK X X X
Suffolk NK X X X
Dyfed-Powys 14 X X X
Gwent 14 X X X
North-Wales 14 X X X
South-Wales 14 X X X
DSI: Days since incident; BaAI: requires before and after in-
cident recording; TS: requires a time stamp; UEF: requires
unedited footage only; NK: not known
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of pre-incident and post incident footage are included in the submission. The reason for this is to
provide context to the incident in question.
Evidence sharing. Cases risk being compromised if evidence is shared with third parties and/or
published online. Sharing evidence in this way could be considered contempt of court [50]. Many
constabularies remind witnesses that evidence must not be shared with third parties nor published
online.
The examination of methods to address these challenges is beyond the scope of the contribution.
However, it is useful to briefly outlines some of the techniques and mechanisms that could be employed
to
4. Experiment
This section reports on the prevalence and provenance of evidential artefacts by the use of seven
dashcams. An experiment was conducted to correlate dashcam features with the evidential artefacts
created by their use and to identify where the artefacts can be located. The experiment aimed to
discover the prevalence of evidential artefacts relating to:
 Recordings made in emergency mode or through triggering the g-sensor in parking mode.
 GPS data.
 Vehicular speed data.
 Licence plate information.
 Temporal data.
A number of dashcam features were not analysed and could form the basis for further research.
These include: the microphone facility (available on all dashcams), the use of the voice command
feature (Garmin), the invocation of the time autoupdate facility (SilentWitness), red light/speed
camera warnings (Garmin), forward collision warning (Garmin), lane departure warnings (Cobra,
Garmin) and wifi connectivity (Nextbase 312, Nextbase 512, Garmin). All the dashcams except the
Garmin, recorded videos in the mov format, the Garmin recorded videos in the mp4 format.
4.1. Dashcams
Dashcams record audio and video, and are also capable of recording photographs. Dashcams are
user-configurable and enable users to set - for example, the recording mode, licence plate, and set
whether a watermark is recorded in the video/photographic footage.
4.1.1. Recording Mode
Dashcams make video recordings in one of four modes: normal, emergency, parking and time-lapse.
The recording mode can help explain the context of an incident.
Normal recordings are made when the ignition is turned on or when a user presses the record
button.
Emergency recordings are made when either the user presses the emergency recording button or
when the g-sensor (gravity sensor) is activated. The g-sensor is an accelerometer which measures
Figure 1: The Cobra video player software (left) and the Nextbase Replay 3 software (right)
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excessive deceleration or acceleration in any axis - such as with an impact when the car is parked
(parking mode).
Emergency and parking recordings are recorded with write attributes disabled and cannot be
overwritten under normal usage. Often these recordings are saved into a uniquely named directory.
A time-lapse recording is essentially a sequence of images which reduce the amount of storage
occupied by a recording. The Nextbase 512 for example, can record timelapse videos at 1/6th of the
normal speed.
4.1.2. Licence Plate Information
Some dashcams enable users to enter a registration/licence plate number for the car in which
the dashcam is installed. Whilst licence plate information was displayed in the watermarks on some
dashcam models (as shown in Table 4), this study could find no evidence of licence plate data being
displayed elsehwere - for example in the metadata.
4.2. Materials.
Seven dashcams: Cobra HD CDR 895D, Garmin 55, Mio MiVue 538, Nextbase 512GW, Nextbase
312GW, RAC205 and SilentWitness SW006 - referred to hitherto as Cobra, Garmin, MiVue,
Nextbase512, Nextbase312, RAC and SilentWitness respectively, were tested under varying condi-
tions to reveal artefacts of forensic interest. These dashcams were selected because they represented a
wide variety of dashcam features such as the emergency recording mode, parking mode, and recording
of license plate data as outlined in Section 4.1.
4.3. Process
A series of recordings were made using each dashcam in turn. An 8GB SD card was used to make
the recordings. This contained sufficient storage space and no recordings were overwritten. A dataset
comprising of 7 dashcam recordings recorded on 16GB SD cards is available to accompany this paper.
Further details on how to obtain this are provided in the front matter to this paper.
Each recording lasted around three hours. Features such as GPS, licence plate, the G-sensor etc.,
were enabled if available on the dashcam. Where the feature was available, a number of recordings
were specifically made in each of the recording modes described in Section 4.1.1.
Dashcams allow users to set the length of each recording. For example, the Mivue allows users to
select 1, 3 or 5 minute recordings. Some dashcams issue a warning when the SD card is full, others -
for instance the Garmin, automatically overwrite the oldest recording. The recording length for each
dashcam was left at the default setting.
Each SD card was removed from the dashcam and a digital forensic image (.E01 format) was
created. This was then analysed to reveal the location and format of evidence created. Folder
locations and filenames were observed using EnCase and Autopsy.
4.4. Analysis Methods
Three types of tool: dedicated forensic tools, external metadata viewers, and/or native video players
were used to analyse the digital forensic images.
4.4.1. Dedicated forensic tools
Although dedicated forensic tools such as Encase, FTK and Autopsy, were used to analyse the
digital forensic image, these tools are limited in their ability to extract specific metadata - such as
GPS data, from MP4 and MOV files, generally, they rely on specially crafted scripts and functions.
4.4.2. Native Video Player
Native video players are available for most dashcams (Figure 1). Native video players synthesise
the video footage, a map, and vehicular speed data into a single user interface. These tools are
generally not accepted in courts and often do not have a provision for extracting the metadata.
However, native video players can be a useful aid to verifying the findings of dedicated forensic tools.
Native video players were available for all the dashcams except Silent Witness.
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4.4.3. Specialist Metadata Extraction Tools
Exiftools [20] is a specialist tool which enable analysts to extract metadata. Exiftools is dedicated
to the extraction of EXIF data. The command: exiftool -ee FILENAME (where -ee means extract
embedded), displays GPS data, vehicular speed and associated timestamps for file FILENAME, and the
command: exiftool -T -FileName -CreateDate - Modifydate -FileSize *.MOV *JPG extracts
dates from all files with the extension .mov and .jpg. An example of the output from exiftools is
provided as follows:
Sample Duration : 0.25s
GPS Latitude : 52 deg 28’ 9.40’’ N
GPS Longitude : 1 deg 55’ 24.25’’
GPS Speed : 26
GPS Speed ref : mph
Sample Time : 0.25s
Sample Duration : 0.25s
5. Results
Table 4 outlines the results of the experiment. The table abbreviates each source as follows: NMEA
files (a), configuration/diagnostic files (c), EXIF metadata (e), directory structures (d), filenames
(f), and watermarks (w).
The table correlates each feature with the associated evidential artefact. This section describes
the provenance and prevalence of evidential artefacts in further detail.
5.1. NMEA (a)
NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) files contain both temporal and GPS data.
These files have a. .nmea extension and are paired with a .mov file. In some dashcams - such as the
MiVue, they have the same filename, for example, xxxxx.mov and xxxxx.nmea.
Examples of fields that contain temporal data include: $GPBWC, $GPZDA, $PMGNTRK and
$PRWIINIT [14].
These fields are referred to as sentences. A brief explanation of some of these fields is presented
herein, for a more detailed explanation, the reader is referred to [5] and [56]






































Cobra ⊗ f p ⊗ f ⊗ ⊗ § § § § e n w ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ f ⊗ w
Nextbase 312GW d ⊗ p d ⊗ ⊗ p ⊗ e n w e n w w ⊗ ⊗ e f n w
Nextbase 512GW d ⊗ p d ⊗ ⊗ p ⊗ e n w e n w w ⊗ ⊗ e f n w
SilentWitness1 ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ e ⊗ ⊗ e ⊗ w w ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ f ⊗ w
MiVue d f p d f n ⊗ a e n w e n w ⊗ a ⊗ e f ⊗ w
Garmin ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ d ⊗ ⊗ p ⊗ e n w e n w ⊗ ⊗ c e ⊗ n w
RAC1 ⊗ f p ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ w
Key: 1does not have a native video player a=NMEA file, c=configuration file, d=directory structure, e=EXIF data in video,
f =filename, n=native video player, p=write protection, w=watermark
§ Optional extra, not included in the system analysed in this research
⊗ not available
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The $GPRMC field provides GPS transit data as well as response times from the satellite. The
following example:
$GPRMC,070851.00,A,5227.77102,N,00156.72583,W,0.032,078.7,041018,010.3,E*6C
can be translated as follows:
 070851.00 is the time of fix (07:08:51 UTC);
 A = valid (where V would mean an invalid fix);
 5227.77102,N means Latitude 52 deg. 27.77 min North (or 52d27’77”N);
 00156.72583,W Longitude 1 deg. 56.72583 min West (or 1d56’72”W);
 0.032 The speed over ground calculated in knots;
 078.7 course made good which is the direction the vehicle is travelling from true North;
 041018 - the date of the fix;
 010.3,E the magnetic variation - in this case 10.3 deg East;
 6C - a mandatory checksum.
The $GPGGA sentence provides GPS fix data and includes data relating to the time and position.
The following example:
$GPGGA,071010.00,5227.76885,N,00156.61993,W,1,08,1.20,151.9,M,48.0,M,,*42
can be translated as follows:
 071010.00 : UTC time of the fix (07:10:10 UTC)
 5227.76885,N : 52d 27.76885’ North (or 52d27’76”N);
 00156.61993,W : 1d 56.61993’West (or 1d56’61”W)
 1 : Data is from a GPD fix;
 08 : there are 8 GPS satellites in use;
 1.20 : this is the relative accuracy of the horizontal position; 151.9, M : This is the distance
above mean sea level; 48.0 M : This is the height of the geoid above WGS84 ellipsoid
 x.x : not present in the above example, but the age of the differential GPS data measured in
seconds;
 42 : checksum
Tools such as the NMEA convertor [46] can be used to convert NMEA to KML which can then
be uploaded to and viewed in Google Earth.
5.2. Configuration Files (c)
Configuration files reveal system configuration and diagnostic data. Examples of this are provided
in the Garmin and MiVue dashcams.
Two key diagnostic files in the Garmin dashcam are the drive hours logger.db and the
elog.JSON. The drive hours logger.db is an SQL file which contains logs of journey times. Each
journey time has a corresponding create timestamp field which presents the time that the entry was
created - indicating the start of the journey. This time is presented in YYY-MM-DD HH MM SS format.
The elog.JSON file stores error data. Two particular fields in the XML file are of importance, these
are the uptime ms field which outlines the time that the unit has been operational in milliseconds,
and the error cause (with Low Battery Shutoff indicating that the unit closed down because of a
failed battery) which has a corresponding Time field indicating the time that the unit closed down.
This field has the format YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.
Similarly, the MiVue saves one configuration file: DEVICE.XML which stores a range of configuration
data such as: the firmware version (FWVersion), the product name (ProductName), the operating
system (OSVersion), the memory size (MemorySize) and the storage size (StorageSize).
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5.3. Directory Structure (d)
The directory naming structure can reveal the recording mode. Table 5 outlines the directory
structure of the seven dashcams under investigation.
The table shows that the Garmin dashcam saves files with directory names such as 100PARKM and
104TLPSE to indicate recordings made in parking mode and timelapse mode respectively. Similarly,
the Nextbase dashcams split normal videos and videos recorded in emergency or parking mode into
the NBDVR/VIDEO/VIDEO and NBDVR/VIDEO/PROTECTED respectively.
Dashcams such as the Cobra, SilentWitness and RAC make no distinctions within the directory
structure.
5.4. Filename Structure (f)
Filename structures can reveal: temporal data; file sequences; and the recording mode. Of these,
the temporal data and recording mode are of importance to the present study. The data provided
in Table 4 shows that 5 of the 7 filename structures (Cobra, Nextbase 512GW, Nextbase 312G,
SilentWitness and MiVue), reveal temporal information. Table 5 shows the filename structure for
each dashcam under investigation.
The Table show for example, that the Cobra has a filename format: YYYYMMDD NNNN CAMN TTT.EXT
where: YYYY is the year, MM is the month and DD is the date.
3 of the 7 filename structures (Cobra, MiVue and RAC) reveal the recording mode within the
filename. So in the same filename format, TTT is any of JPG (photo), MOV (movie) or SOS which
indicates that the recording was made using the emergency function or with the GSensor facility
activated. Similarly, the MiVue has a video filename format: TTTTYYMMDD-HHmmSS.MOV, where TTTT
can be EMER for emergency recordings, FILE for normal recordings, and PARK for recordings made in
parking mode.
Table 5: Directory/filename structures
Make Filename/directory structure
Cobra Filename: YYYYMMDD NNNN CAMN TTT.EXT TTT: is any of JPG (photo), MOV (movie); SOS: a recording made using
the emergency function or with the GSensor facility activated; NNNN: sequence number; CAMN: camera, where
CAM1 and CAM2 are the forward and reverse facing cameras respectively e.g., 20160101 0006 CAM1 VID.MOV,
20160101 0010 CAM1 IMG.JPG and 20181106 0004 CAM1 SOS.MOV
Directory: DCIM/100/DSC : all files
Garmin Filename: GRMSNNNN.EXT where EXT could be MP4 or JPG e.g., GRMN0021.MP4
Directory: DCIM/100EVENT : GSensor activated recordings; DCIM/101PHOTO : photos; DCIM/102SAVED : normal
mode; DCIM/103PARKM : parking mode; DCIM/104TLPSE : timelapse mode; DCIM/105UNSVD : unsaved video
footage
Nextbase312 Filename: YYYY MMDD HHmmSS NNN.EXT
e.g., 2018 1007 051316 001.jpg
Directory: DCIM/PHOTO : photos; DCIM/VIDEO : videos; DCIM/PROTECTED : parking mode
Nextbase512 Filename: YYYY MM DD HHmmSS NNN.EXT
e.g., 2018 100 7 051316 001.jpg
Directory: NBDVR/PHOTO : photos; NBDVR/VIDEO : videos; NBDVR/VIDEO/PROTECTED : parking mode and
emergency mode
SilentWitness Filename: MMDDHHmm NNNN.EXT
Directory: DCIM/100Media : normal mode?
MiVue Filename: Photos: IMGYYMMDD-HHmmSS.JPG Video: FILEYYMMDD-HHmmSS.MOV, where FILE can be EMER for
emergency recordings, FILE for normal recordings, and PARK for recordings made in parking mode.
Directory: Emergency : emergency mode; Normal : normal mode; Parking : parking mode; Photo : photos
RAC Filename: XXXXNNNN.EXT, where XXXX is a four-letter prefix which can have the values: MOV for recordings,
IMAG for pictures and SOS for emergency-saved files.
Directory: 100_NOML : contains all the recorded files‡.
Key: YYYY: year; MM: month; DD: date; HH hour (24 hour); mm minutes; SS seconds. In all examples, NNNN is the sequence number.
†Files named according to the DCIM standard [27]. \elog.json - Error log, stores data such as power shutdown due to poor
battery; Garmin/Garmin.XML - System configuration data; /Garmin/Diag/GarminOS.log - a record of when the Garmin was turned
on; /.System/SQLite/drive_hours_logger - SQL database ‡/DCIM/DATA Contains a file called GSensor_Info.txt
?/Player - stores the native video player for the dashcam
All the dashcam devices store local time and not UTC time - this is notwithstanding the data stored in the NMEA files (described
in Section 5.1)
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Filenames can be correlated with the system file timestamps and watermark (w) timestamps to
help determine whether filenames have been tampered with.
5.5. Application Metadata (e)
Artefacts such as timestamps and GPS data can be found in the application metadata within video
files using tools such as exiftools (geospatial and temporal data from within video files) as shown in
Section 4.4.3.
6. Discussion
Having outlined the sources of evidential artefact, it is useful to summarise where the features
outlined in Section 4 can be located in a dashcam SD card. The data is provided comprehensively in
Table 4 and can be summarised briefly here.
6.1. GPS data
GPS data is found in at least four places:
 as a watermark (w) within the video if the feature has been enabled (highlighted in Figure 2).
 In the EXIF metadata (e) within video files. This can be recovered using specialist tools such
as exiftools and log2timeline - as shown in Section 4.4.3.
 In NMEA data - as shown in Section 5.1.
 In a native video player (n) (Figure 1) - as shown in Section 4.4.2.
6.2. Vehicular speed data
Vehicular speed data can be viewed using a native video player (n) as a watermark (w) within the
video if the feature has been enabled (Figure 2), and as EXIF metadata (e) within the metadata as
described in Section 4.4.3.
6.3. Licence plate information
Licence plate information is only available as a watermark (w) within the video if the feature has
been enabled (this is shown in Figure 2 right).
6.4. Temporal data
The analysis of time is important not only to identify the time of the incident under investigation,
but because the time could be deliberately manipulated by a suspect to argue an alibi. All the
dashcams under investigation - and presumably on the market, record temporal data. Table 4 shows
that temporal data can be found in at least five locations:
 Within The NMEA file (a) which pulls time data from GPS systems - as shown in Section 5.1.
 Within configuration files (c) - as shown in Section 5.2.
 As EXIF metadata (e) - within MOV/MP4/JPG files - as shown in Section 5.5.
 Within the filename structure (f ) - as shown in Section 5.4.
Figure 2: [Left] A dashcam watermark from a Garmin dashcam [Right] A dashcam watermark from a Nextbase312
dashcam demonstrating licence plate data
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 As a watermark (w) within the video if the feature has been enabled - as shown in Figure 2.
In addition to these locations, temporal data is also available in the following locations:
 Within the video imagery itself where daytime/nightime recording can be clearly seen. Systems
such as Suncalc [21] can be used to help determine the time (Figure 3).
 As system metadata in file timestamps. This has been explained in detail by [10] and [47] and
many other authors and will not be repeated here.
7. Conclusions
Insofar as the author is aware, this is the first significant contribution to analysing the sources of
evidential artefacts in a dashcam system. The research outlined herein creates a number of opportu-
nities for further research in an area that is becoming increasingly important.
This research has highlighted the problems related to the management and processing of dashcam
evidence and has applied a particular emphasis on analysing the evidential artefact sources in a
dashcam. The research showed that the artefacts are available in seven locations - namely the NMEA
file, configuration files, directory naming structures, EXIF metadata, filename structures, file system
attributes, and watermarks. The research also showed that evidential artefacts can be synthesised
using proprietary tools such as native video players.
Section 4.3 outlined that there were a number of dashcam features which were not investigated in
this study. These features include the the microphone facility, the use of the voice command feature
(Garmin), the invocation of the time autoupdate facility (SilentWitness), red light/speed camera
warnings (Garmin), forward collision warning (Garmin), lane departure warnings (Cobra, Garmin)
and Wi-Fi connectivity (Nextbase 312, Nextbase 512, Garmin). These areas are all worthy of further
investigation, and in particular, it would be useful to determine if the use of the Wi-Fi facility on a
dashcam leaves evidentiary artefacts in other locations.
This research explored the evidentiary artefacts created by the dashcam on an SD card. The
research has not investigated the existence of evidentiary artefacts left directly on the dashcam – or
methods of extracting these artefacts.
This research has shown that a number of tools were required to extract and analyse the evidential
artefacts. Better methods are required for extracting and synthesising the metadata from dashcams.
This work could include the extraction of watermark data and other data within the imagery itself
Figure 3: Estimating the time of day using Suncalc
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to identify location and objects. A number of contributions have previously considered this [26, 54].
However, a cursory investigation of the literature appears to show that there is a dearth of material
specifically evaluating the efficacy of extracting metadata from watermark data using OCR techniques.
Section 6.4 outlined the locations of the temporal data that can be found within dashcam devices.
Collectively, the paper has shown that there is a wide range of both geospatial and temporal data
on a dashcam. The discussion herein has not proceeded to provide additional information on the
relationships between the range of geospatial and temporal data. This is an area for future research
- which might particularly focus on both synthesising this data and analysing it.
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